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Abstract
Transparency has gained much relevance in food chains. This paper summarizes the determi-
nants of transparency and points out that transparency in the sense of effective information ex-
change needs trust as a mediator in order to become a powerful tool in supply chain
management. In addition to that this paper analyses the characteristics of trust and highlights the
reciprocal and dynamic mechanisms of trust on transparency and vice versa. It is argued that
both constructs should be enhanced at the same time in order to realize the benefits of trust and
transparency on supply chain management.
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1   Introduction
Enhanced by several crises the demand for transparency in supply chains as a matter of risk
prevention and consumer protection has developed into a general demand for improved access
to information in order to regain consumer trust in food products. 
In order to understand the role of transparency in supply chains in general, it is necessary to
analyze transparency in more detail. How can transparency be defined, and what are its main
characteristics and determinants? Does trust limit transparency? Answers to these questions
require a deeper analysis of trust: How does trust influence transparency, and how does
transparency influence trust? Both constructs are analyzed separately in various research areas
but there are only a few papers that consider the effects of trust on transparency and vice versa
at the same time. This paper highlights the importance of a cross-disciplinary analysis of trust
and transparency in order to understand their complex relationship.
2   Characteristics of Transparency
Transparency is a multifaceted phenomenon. In everyday understanding it means clearness and
lucidity (Loddenkemper, 1998; Nitschke, 2002). In a physical sense transparency is the
property of transmitting light through a substance so that objects lying beyond or behind it can
be seen clearly. In a sociological or psychological context transparency implies honesty and
openness (Jensen, 2001; Hofstede et al, 2004). Transparency enables one to understand the
effects and consequences of a decision or a behavior and furthers understanding of
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cause-effect-connections which enables all human beings to orientate themselves in a complex
environment, to reach their targets in an uncertain environment and to participate actively in all
areas of human mankind. Therefore transparency in the sociological or psychological
understanding of gaining information and knowledge about the environment in order to
prepare certain actions or decisions can be identified as a general requirement for all human
beings, as a main motivational factor of human behavior and as a central aspect of the
existence and development of social systems (Karg, 1990; Winterstein, 1996; Meyerhuber,
2001).
Another strand in research on transparency concentrates on economic issues. From this
perspective transparency means to supply a complete and detailed survey of all market
conditions to make it available to all participants at the same time (Henrichsmeyer et al, 1993;
Russo, 1996; Krone, 2003). Profit maximization is necessarily connected to the presence of
knowledge about products and prices on the buyers’ side and customer demands and
competitor activities on the suppliers’ side. Otherwise market participants will not be able to
consider the opportunities and risks of a certain behavior and decisions will be taken by chance
rather than in accordance with economic advantage and strategic choice (Brinkmann, 1963;
Stöffler, 1982; Reisch, 2003).
Based on social and economic points of view, transparency has developed to a general claim
with respect to social systems and democratic processes. The right to transparency is assured
by various decrees, regulations and laws passed by the EU and national governments
(Nitschke, 2002). Agribusiness in particular is a sector which is being confronted with new
regulatory standards in order to make production processes more transparent. This is fuelled by
targets like risk prevention, consumer protection and regaining trust in food products (Reisch,
2003). Against this background many people associate transparency with tracking and tracing
systems that allow them to see what is produced and how it is produced (Hofstede, 2003a).
Hofstede (2003b) calls this history transparency, which he characterizes as being primarily
defensive, focusing on events in the past, enhancing rapid reaction in the case of accidents and
often being imposed from outside the chain (for example, by government).
But cross-disciplinary review of the literature has shown that transparency is more than just
tracking and tracing; it includes factors like orientation, participation and communication.
Thus, transparency can be a powerful tool for supply chain management because it offers the
potential for offensive and voluntary information transfer between business partners. Hofstede
(2003b) differentiates two levels of voluntary information exchange beyond history tr
ansparency. The first level – operations transparency – leads to the coordination of business
operations, like collaborative planning of daily activities (such as logistics), and focuses
present challenges. The second level – strategy transparency – includes reciprocal information
flows from a future-based and strategic perspective (such as product innovation). All in all,
transparency “is the extent to which all the netchain’s stakeholders have a shared
understanding of, and access to, the product-related information that they request, without loss,
noise, delay and distortion.” (Hofstede, 2003a, p. 18).Mechthild Frentrup and Ludwig Theuvsen   67
Although general economic theory often promotes maximum transparency as a beneficial
target, researchers agree that in reality complete or perfect transparency is not the goal to aim
for. Competition needs the presence of some uncertainty about winners and losers in order to
push all participants and to avoid illegal arrangements and imitative behavior that counteracts
competition and market mechanisms (Brinkmann, 1963; Jensen, 2001). Furthermore, human
information processing capacities are limited so that in real life many decisions have to be
taken under conditions of uncertainty, that is, with limited transparency (Albrecht, 1968).
But what determines the degree of transparency in food supply chains? On the one hand,
barriers to transparency arise due to organizational and structural factors (Figure 1). Theuvsen
(2004, p. 128), for example, identifies the division of labor in supply chains as an important
determinant: “The more intense the division of labor, the more process interdependencies
result and […] the lower transparency is. The number of process interdependencies […] is
mainly determined by the degree of specialization, the number of … transaction partners and
the frequency of transactions.” On the other hand, transparency is limited by social and
relational factors that influence the quality of business relationships and information exchange
behavior. Van Dijk et al (2003) and Theuvsen (2004) point out that cultural and physical as
well as cognitive and emotional closeness affect transparency in a positive way, whereas power
asymmetries and opportunistic behavior have negative effects on information transfers. Here
trust as a determinant of information exchange behavior and a mediator for transparency
comes into play and deserves a closer look (Meyerhuber, 2001).
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3   Characteristics of Trust
Trust is also a multifaceted phenomenon: “From an economic perspective, […] trusting
somebody is a way to save transaction costs. To a psychologist, […] trusting somebody makes
one feel more secure, so one can give one’s attention to other things. A sociologist might infer
that the trusted person is a likely candidate for a network of friends or business relations”
(Hofstede, 2003b, p. 4). Schweer and Thies (2003) give an interesting overview on different
research streams. The first major definition of trust is its conceptualization as a personal
variable in the development of human personality and individuality. This approach is
represented by Erikson (1966) and his theory that each individual has to acquire a kind of
general confidence towards the world and the environment in earliest childhood. Another
representative of this research stream is Rotter (1981), who describes trust as something that
constructs itself in a process of personal experience and leads to a general trustful or distrustful
attitude towards others. The second major understanding of trust is reflected in the theory
represented by Deutsch (1958) and others that trust is a situationally determined decision. The
decision to trust includes uncertainty about the result of an action because this result is not
dependant on the person’s own activity alone but also on another’s behavior. Coleman’s (1990)
rational choice theory is another example of the understanding of trust as a calculative
weighing of perceived gains and losses in the form of a game or a bet. Schweer and Thies
(2003) come to the conclusion that the components of trust in real life are at the same time
cognitive, affective and behavioral; all of them are embedded in a network of relational,
industrial and cultural elements (Köster, 2003), which means that trust is influenced by
experiences in the past, impressions of the present and expectations of the future.
Based on recent research in economics, psychology and sociology, Rousseau et al (1998, p.
395) come to a multidisciplinary definition of trust as “a psychological state comprising the
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior
of another.” The keyword vulnerability implies the risk of being disappointed or violated as a
basic character of trust (Coleman, 1990; Bigley & Pearce, 1998; Dyer & Chu, 2000). The
decision to trust is at the same time a decision against control (Plötner, 1995): “Trusting
somebody means that you do not need to take the trouble of checking on them, accepting the
chance that they might cheat on you” (Meijer & Hofstede, 2003). As a conclusion the main
elements that engender trust are risk, knowledge, predictability and free will (Adams &
Goldsmith, 1999). Given the bounded rationality of human beings, sociologists identify in trust
a complexity- and risk-reducing function (Luhmann, 1989). Thus, trust is “vital for the
maintenance of cooperation in society and necessary as grounds for even the most routine,
everyday action” (Zucker, 1986, p. 56).
Trust is a dynamic construct that needs time and voluntary reciprocal interaction to be
generated successfully (Schweer & Thies, 2003). Based on the first impression of another
person or a business partner, trust is initially tested in less risky situations or on less important
decisions. If the truster is not disappointed by the trusted, trust will be manifested on a more
stable level; that is, the relationship becomes more trustful (Plötner, 1995; Meijer & Hofstede,
2003). Shapiro et al (1992) describe the development of trust in business relationships in three
stages that can be achieved over time (Figure 2). In most cases the first level is calculus-
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of costs and benefits or the presence of penalties in the case of violated trust. What some
scholars criticize here, however, is that the risk-reducing mechanism in this situation is control
rather than trust, and, therefore, they do not accept deterrence-based trust as trust in the true
sense of the word (Schweer & Thies, 2003; Das & Teng, 1998). The second level of trust
building is gaining knowledge about and experience with the transaction partner in order to
make the partner’s behavior predictable (Shapiro et al, 1992). This level of trust – knowledge-
based trust – is based on information instead of deterrence and control. The third level of trust
is based on common intentions, values and norms. This level of trust – identification-based
trust – requires reciprocal implementation of identical philosophies and convictions and trust
as a general principle of organization (Schweer & Thies, 2003).
Figure 2. Development of trust in business relationships (Shapiro et al, 1992)
4   Transparency and Trust: A Tricky Relationship
Transparency and trust have been identified as increasingly important for the creation of
business networks (Meyerhuber, 2001; Van Dijk et al, 2003; Hofstede et al, 2004). Due to the
dynamic character of both constructs, the question arises whether there are reciprocal
influences. Is transparency necessary to build a trustful relationship? Or is trust necessary to
improve transparency? The general comprehension of transparency – easy and rapid
information exchange – implies willingness to cooperate and to consider the supply chain as a
team. Interpersonal cooperation and teamwork is free exchange of knowledge and information
(Jones & George, 1998). This understanding of transparency implies at the same time the
decision to share knowledge and to take the risk that the partner might exploit the information
in an opportunistic manner and as a competitive advantage. These aspects are all well known
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as basic elements of trust. So the question remains: do the constructs transparency and trust
describe the same phenomenon of collaboration and cooperation in business relationships?
Hofstede (2003b, p. 4) points out that “people who trust one another do not need to tell each
other anything just to show what they did. They only tell one another what they know the other
needs to know.” Therefore “trust and transparency in netchains can be contradictory because in
real life to trust means to accept an objectively incomplete status of information or knowledge
as subjectively sufficient” (Apelt, 1999). The key point is that knowledge is a source of power
(Jones & George, 1998), and information asymmetries are closely related to power
asymmetries and opportunistic behavior. Moreover, power connotes control and counteracts
the principles of teamwork and cooperation. The voluntariness and mutuality of an action or a
communication process are identified as the dominant factors in trust building because to show
the intention to share information or to provide confidential data means to trust the partner. But
if “transparency is imposed from outside the netchain, or if the netchain is in fact
institutionally a hierarchy and the leader imposes transparency”, transparency and trust
contradict each other (Hofstede, 2003b, p. 8). As a consequence, history transparency, which is
often imposed by the government, does not build trust because of its obligatory character.
Thus, tracking and tracing systems might be interpreted as signals of distrust because trusting
somebody means that there is no need to track or trace.
In contrast, the implementation of operations and strategy transparency is valuable for trust
building because of their generally voluntary character. The obligation to track and trace
should be taken as an opportunity to establish more profitable and long-term forms of
transparency, that is, operations and strategy transparency (Meijer & Hofstede, 2003;
Hofstede, 2003b). These forms of transparency are closely related to knowledge-based and
identification-based forms of trust rather than to deterrence-based trust. Trust leads to
cooperative behavior among individuals, groups and organizations; cooperation and teamwork
are the framework for transparency in the understanding of an effective information exchange
between business partners (Jones & George, 1998). The absence of trust limits the
effectiveness of transparency on supply chain management (Hofstede et al, 2004) because
information in general is not a guarantee of transparency; the precondition and the mediator for
transparency in business relationships is trust (Meyerhuber, 2001).
But the paradox of trust is that only trust breeds trust. That means that to receive trust one has
to assume trust. This leads to the question who does the first step in trust-building? In this
respect, transparency becomes a precondition and a mediator for trust (DiPiazza & Eccles,
2002) and vice versa because information exchange in general – especially on a voluntary
basis – includes a power-balancing and trust-building function. Due to the circular nature of
the relation between trust and transparency, both constructs should be enhanced at the same
time in order to support the accelerating effects and avoid the potential contradictions between
trust and transparency. Figure 3 illustrates the framework for trust and transparency in supply
chains.Mechthild Frentrup and Ludwig Theuvsen   71
Figure 3. Trust and transparency in supply chains
5   Trust, Transparency and the Organization of Food Chains
The improvement of competitiveness in a complex and rapidly changing environment based on
effective information exchange is the dominant reason for implementing trust and transparency
in supply chains. Scholars agree that transparency and trust as sources of strategic advantage
should receive more attention (Russo, 1996; Holst, 1998; Meyerhuber, 2001; Van Dijk et al,
2003). In food chains transparency has gained much relevance but is implemented mainly from
outside the chain more as a matter of risk prevention and consumer protection than as a matter
of improving the chain’s effectiveness. 
There are two main reasons why trust and transparency are limited to the obligatory levels of
history transparency and calculus-based trust in today’s supply chains in general and agrifood
chains in particular. First, modern society has developed to a rapidly changing, technologically
determined environment with a high information output to be processed by human beings with
limited information-processing capacities. As a consequence, reality is characterized by
confusion instead of orientation and increasing perception of but decreasing acceptance of
risks – in other words a lack of transparency and trust (Reisch, 2003; Schweer & Thies, 2003).
Second, business transactions are confronted with the challenges of increasing
internationalization and globalization, which leads to a growing number of actual and potential
transaction partners with different cultural backgrounds. Therefore, transparency is – from
both the organizational and the social perspective – negatively influenced (Theuvsen, 2004).
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Strategies like vertical cooperation and integration are identified as powerful tools for
improving transparency in food chains and as solutions to the trust and transparency dilemma
(Hofstede, 2003a; Theuvsen, 2004). First, food chain integration comes with formal or
informal guidelines on procedures, thus standardizing the behavior of business partners and
enforcing obligatory and voluntary communication. Food chain integration creates an
environment of social embeddedness with respect to relational and cultural aspects, which
influences transparency and trust in a positive way because mutuality and reciprocity –
important preconditions to accepting vulnerability and risk and to trusting another person
(Luhmann, 1989; Coleman, 1990) – come into play. Relational embeddedness leads to
knowledge about business partners (whether gained by one’s own experience or based on the
partner’s reputation) and supports trust on the knowledge-based level. Cultural embeddedness
includes a collective program of the mind (Doney et al, 1998) and implements trust on the
institution-based level. The social embeddedness approach can explain the prevalence of long-
term orientation instead of short-term, profit-orientated behavior in business relationships and
the existence of trust even in power-asymmetric relationships (Köster, 2003). Second, food
chain integration offers positive effects on organizational barriers to transparency since it
reduces the number and coordination requirements of process interdependencies in supply
chains. This leads to an increase in cognitive and emotional closeness with benefits with
respect to trust.
Thus, food chain integration may improve trust and transparency at the same time. But it
should be kept in mind that neither construct is a guarantee of cooperation and the absence of
risk. Trust and transparency are investments in business relationships (Adams & Goldsmith,
1999) with the focus on balancing costs and benefits. In this respect, an external impulse, such
as the obligation to track and trace, often has to be imposed on all chain members in order to
surmount social and organizational barriers and to implement trust and transparency as one
major and powerful concept in supply chain management.
6   Conclusion and Future Research
The relationship between transparency and trust is reciprocal ,and, as a result, the two must be
considered as tools in supply chain management at the same time. The implementation of both
constructs in supply chains causes measurable costs, whereas the benefits are hard to calculate.
The challenge is to find the balance between costs and benefits in order to determine the
optimal degree of trust and transparency in food chains (Sporleder & Goldsmith, 2002; Van
Dijk et al, 2003; Hofstede et al, 2004).
Further research should address the development of management concepts in order to enlarge
the existing tracking and tracing strategies to more powerful and trust-building forms of
transparency in supply chains.Mechthild Frentrup and Ludwig Theuvsen   73
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